VICTORIAN
BUSHFIRE INQUIRY 2003
Submission by A. Hodgson.
This
submission addresses part only of Term of Reference No.1 viz; " Examine the effectiveness of
preparedness for the 2002/03 bushfire season, including hazard reduction"
Commissioner Bruce Elspin,
Victorian Bushfire
Inquiry 2003.
c/- GPO 4192VV
Dear Commissioner,
Preamble.
The tragedy of the fires in the alpine area
in 2003 is not that more than a million hectares was burnt but rather that too
large an area was burnt in too short a time and in many places the fires were
too hot.
The drought in the alpine area preceding the
fires was not the "worst ever" or even "the worst in a
lifetime" that some people suggest. The winds during the first two weeks
the fires burned were mostly from the east and south and the fire weather in
that time was benign compared to some notable fire-events in the past. Land and
fire management agencies faced almost identical circumstances in the 1884/85
fire season and achieved a better outcome.
During the recent fires, senior Departmental
officers and others made statements about fuel reduction, fire behaviour and
drought in the alpine area that are wrong and misleading. Since the fires, the
Government’s interim Report on Bushfire Recovery compared losses (fatalities,
houses, stock and area burnt) during the January 2003 fires with losses during
fires in 1939 and 1983. The events of 1939 and 1983 are so different to the
January 2003 fires that the inferred conclusion is also misleading.
When the Premier announced your Inquiry, he
said he believed
My credentials are attached to this
submission. To that experience I can add that as a near nine-year-old boy I
helped my father, sisters and brother fight the 1939 fires on the family farm
in the Nariel valley. We stopped the fire at the same place that the fire
fighting agencies stopped the recent fires. I mention this not as a matter of
personal interest but to indicate I have clear recollections of the very severe
drought, the extreme weather and the fire behaviour at that time. Also, out of
the 1939 fires came new legislation and the policy and
strategies that drove hazard reduction for the next 40 years. Those things are
relevant to your Inquiry.
I have structured this submission to start
with the fire events of 1938/39 and then follow the rise and fall in the
quantity and quality of fuel reduction programs that occurred in my lifetime.
To assist your Inquiry I have referenced the source of most of the information
I used.
ROYAL COMMISSIONS AND THE
LAW.
Judge Leonard E B Stretton sitting as a Royal
Commissioner reported on the bushfires of January 1939. (1). Judge Stretton
heard evidence that the Forests Commission regarded timber production as its
prime responsibility and that while it did some strategic strip and patch
burning it did not support widespread burning of the forest floor because it
was "not an economic proposition" and "burning
in the long run ruins the forest. "
Judge Stretton was scathing in his response
to this evidence. Of controlled burning he said:
"This consists of strip and patch burning. The amount of
this burning which was done was ridiculously inadequate. The Commission’s
officers regard the forest as a producer of revenue and for this reason and
because their education appears to lead them to demand that no tree or seedling
be destroyed except in the course of silviculture, they are averse to burning
of any sort. In one instruction to officers to pile and burn thinnings they
were directed no to do so if damage to seedlings would result."
He also said, "It must be stated
as an objective fact that the Commission has failed in its policy of fire
prevention and suppression. Part of its failure is due to the matter referred
to in the preceding paragraph. (Ministerial control
of money). The rest can be set down to its failure to
recognize until recently a truth which is universal, namely, that fire
prevention must be the paramount consideration of the forester".
In 1944, fires burnt more than a million
hectares, killed 59 people and set the Yallourn open cut coalmine alight. The
community expressed outrage and Judge Stretton was again asked to report as a
Royal Commission. The Government responded to these Royal Commissions by:
(I), creating the Country Fire Authority with
responsibility for fire suppression in the "country area of
(II), amending the Forests Act to provide
that: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other Act or
law it shall be the duty of the Commission to carry out proper and sufficient
work for the prevention and suppression of fire in every State forest and
national park and on all protected public land but in any national park or
protected public land proper and sufficient work for the prevention of fire
shall be undertaken only by agreement with the person or body having the
management and control thereof---."
This law, Section 62 (2) of the Forests Act
1958, is still in place today and the duty imposed by it is carried by the
successor to the Forests Commission.
FUEL REDUCTION BURNING
(FRB) AND ITS EFFECTS ON SUBSEQUENT WILDFIRES: Some facts and fallacies.
Facts.
FRB does not prevent wildfires starting and
it rarely stops them burning. By modifying fuels, it changes the behaviour of
subsequent wildfires in ways that give suppression forces a better chance of
controlling them. The fuel characteristics that are modified by FRB and
the consequent benefits for fire control are:
(I). The total
weight of fine fuel is reduced. This
reduces the rate of spread and rate of heat output (fireline intensity) of the
flame front of a subsequent fire.
(II). The height
of the scrub layer is lowered. This
reduces the height of flames. Visibility is increased and firefighters can work
closer to the edge of the fire and in greater safety.
(III). The
fibrous and flaky bark on the trunks and branches of trees and shrubs is
removed. This fuel becomes flying embers in a wildfire and causes spot
fires to start beyond the fire front. Without this fuel, long distance
"spotting" does not occur and short distance "ember
attacks" like those seen in the January 2003 fires, are rare.
The scientific basis of the above facts is
well researched and documented. References (2) and (3) are sources of the
research. The practice of FRB has been examined in a number of Reviews over the
last two decades. (4), (5). The findings of those examinations are
substantially the same as those of the Lewis Review of Forest Management in
"The theory of prescribed
fuel-reduction burning has a sound basis in research which has been conducted
into the relationship between fuel load and fire behaviour. As a consequence,
fuel reduction has assisted fire control operations under a wide range of
conditions. The lowered incidence and intensity of wildfires in areas that have
been subject to prescribed burning for fuel reduction is incontrovertible.
Therefore, the use of ecologically-conscious prescribed burning as an effective
and relatively cheap method of reducing fuel levels should continue to play a
major role in modifying the natural events system in the future."
Case histories have been documented showing
the effect of FRB on subsequent wildfires. (7), (8), (9). One instance not yet
documented occurred near Omeo in January this year. In 2001 and 2002 the
Department of Natural Resources and Environment reduced forest fuels in Omeo’s
water supply catchment. (Butchers Creek). In January
2003 the catchment was impacted by wildfire spreading rapidly from the
northwest and throwing embers into and beyond the catchment. The effect of the
reduced fuel load on the wildfire is striking. Part of the catchment did not
burn and the part that did burn shows less scorch and less soil exposure than
nearby areas that were not fuel-reduced. After the fires in January the area
received some severe storms. Omeo’s reticulated water supply remained potable
after the storms. After the same storms, Swifts Creek’s water supply drawn from
the
Fallacies that emerged
during the 2002/03-fire season.
"------ The current fire is in
mountainous country where it moves rapidly through the forest canopy well ahead of any ground fire
activity". (Weekly Times, Feb 19. 2003. page
17.)
A canopy (crown) fire occurs when heat from a
very intense ground fire raises the temperature of the leaves in the tree
canopy to ignition point and burning embers from the ground fire are lifted
into the canopy by the convection plume and ignite the leaves. A tree canopy
cannot, on its own, support a fire. In the absence of an intense ground fire,
crown fires do not occur. A crown fire cannot move well ahead of the intense
ground fire that started and supports it.
"---the current alpine fires are
roaring unabated through areas that have been fuel-reduced in recent
years." (Weekly Times, Feb.
2003. page 17.)
During the time the fires burned in January
2003 there were a few days when fuel- reduction would not have had any
noticeable effect on the fires. For most of the time the fires burned,
fuel-reduction would have had an effect and, where it had been done, it did.
"—the past five years had been so
warm and dry that the window of opportunity to burn safely in autumn had been small." (Weekly
Times, March 5, 2003. page 10.)
Opportunities to conduct safe and effective
fuel-reduction burns increase in dry periods. They decrease in
periods of above average rainfall and when the number of wet days is more than
the norm.
Your Inquiry must not be misled by these
fallacies. That they were promulgated by the Chief Executive, Parks Victoria in
response to criticism alleging mis-management of fire hazards on national parks
prior to the recent fires must concern your Inquiry. Parks Victoria manages
national parks and by law, fire prevention work such as FRB can only done on national parks with the agreement of Parks Victoria.
The Chief Executive therefore can exert enormous influence on the planning for,
and execution of work to reduce hazardous fuels on national parks.
The fallacies quoted suggest serious flaws in
knowledge about fire behaviour and fire management at the highest level in
Parks Victoria. Your Inquiry should not be surprised to receive submissions
alleging that this flawed knowledge contributed to the increase in hazardous
fuels on national parks. And further, as a consequence of the increase in area
of national parks those hazardous fuels are now seen as an immediate threat to
private assets. .
FRB PROGRAMS.
Judge Stretton’s criticism
(1) and the new legislation that made it mandatory for the Forests Commission
to carry out proper and sufficient work for the prevention and suppression of
fire triggered programs to reduce flammable fuels and make forests and national
parks safer from fire. The rise
and fall of those programs is illustrated in the figure below, which is adapted
from Dr. Kevin Tolhurst’s recent Paper. (10). It shows the annual area burnt by
FRB on public land. (Black line represents the rolling 10-year average.)
The Rise of FRB
Programs.
Little progress was made in the mid and late
1940’s when the effect of the 1939 and 1944 fires was still obvious and scarce
resources were directed to salvaging fire killed timber. By 1950 the programs
were escalating. In the early 1950’s I was a junior forester working in
When bulldozers and 4 wheel drive vehicles
became available the Forests Commission built an extensive system of "jeep
tracks" to allow burning of previously inaccessible forests. It also
developed technology to allow fires to be ignited from aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft
and helicopters were used with helicopters favored in mountain forests where
the quality of burning depended on lighting fires along contours and
progressively down slope. Areas up to 4000 ha were ignited in an afternoon.
(11). The technology enabled operations managers to
take full advantage of the best weather conditions and importantly, extent FRB
to places where ground crews could not work efficiently and safely.
FRB programs continued to escalate until the
early 1980’s. They twice came under serious scrutiny in this period. Sir Esler
Hamilton Barber (12) said in connection with a wildfire at
Following the Ash Wednesday fires in 1983,
the Government allocated $ 1 million extra for FRB programs on State
forests and national parks. Given the incontrovertible evidence that the
practice is an effective and cheap way of reducing the damage caused by
wildfires and given that the Government doubled the money available for FRB
programs it could be expected that such programs would continue to escalate
after 1983. That did not happen.
The Fall of FRB
Programs.
FRB peaked in 1981 and then fell. Records are
available in Departmental Annual Reports and are illustrated in Dr. Tolhurst’s
Paper. (10).
Your Inquiry should disregard any claim that
because smaller FRB programs in recent years give top priority to the
protection of life, private property and high values on public land and as a
consequence, are as effective as were larger programs in the past. The truth is
that FRB on public land has always targeted hazardous fuels in places where
fires were most likely to threaten life and private property. (4).
Evidence of the fall in
quality of FRB.
Mr. Phil Cheney (CSIRO) reported evidence of
poor operations that emerged concurrently with the fall in the extent of
burning done. (14). He was asked to examine the circumstances surrounding a
prescribed fire at Moggs Creek (Otways Fire No 4) that was ignited on 17
November 1994. Two days later it became a very intense wildfire within the burn
area and subsequently overran the control lines. He found that the ignition
pattern used was never likely to achieve the burn objective of 80% gross area
even if it had been carried out during the optimum burning period on 17 Nov.
Staff were concerned that they would be criticized if the burning scorched
vegetation close to private property and this concern "influenced
his (operations officer) decision not to establish perimeter
burns more rapidly and which delayed his lighting inside the block".
In 1994 I was asked to assist in a revision
of the Department’s prescriptions for prescribed burning. During that work I
examined in detail six fuel-reduction burns that escaped control in the
immediate past. In five cases the fires escaped one or two days after the
ignition and for the same reason(s) the Moggs Creek fire escaped, i.e., they
were timidly planned and executed and left too much fuel unburnt, particularly
the flaky elevated fuel. I also found evidence that other prescribed burns
would have little effect on subsequent wildfires because they burnt only a
fraction of the total area and/or left too much hazardous fuel unburnt. These
burns were regarded as successful because they conformed to planning
prescriptions and did not escape control. Phil Cheney (14) pointed out that the
planning prescriptions were misleading and could lead an operations officer
into a false sense of security.
Reasons for the fall in
quantity and quality of FRB.
The causes of the decline in the quantity and
quality of FRB programs have much to do with the increasing community interest
that started in the 1970’s about all things to do with forests, forestry and
public land management. In 1983 there was a "sea-change" in the
structure of Government agencies managing public land and in the way they
conducted their business. A mega-Department was created that made it easier for
staff to transfer or be transferred, from one discipline to another. Structural
and administration changes slowed the assembly of any work-force that comprised
people or equipment from two or more disciplines. Early retirement became more
attractive to some. Ministers and their advisers took greater interest in the
current affairs and issues of the day than they did in the past and the Media
insured that they did so.
These changes diluted the experience and
skills directly involved in planning, supervising and conducting FRB. They also
gave unprecedented opportunities for special interest groups to influence FRB
programs. Some special interest groups saw FRB as an adjunct to the commercial
use of native vegetation and opposed burning as a way to pursue a bigger
agenda. Special interest groups often directed a barrage of opinion at
politicians and the Media creating a perception that their particular view was
right and popular. I have personal knowledge of this sort of action causing a burn
to be stopped after it started and others to be "deferred pending further
research" which effectively meant the same thing.
The pressure some of these changes placed on
individuals required to ignite and manage fires was enormous. FRB is not an
exact science and its practice always involves some risk. The task of the
operations officer responsible for ignition is to achieve the objectives of
burning and at the same time, manage the risks so that any undesirable outcome
is minimized and acceptable. In the political climate prevailing through the
1990’s any outcome that made news was unacceptable regardless of whether or not
the objective of burning was met. Staff were exposed to criticism and naturally
felt that their professional reputation was on the line every time they made a
decision to burn. Many doubted the support they would receive if "their
burn" became newsworthy.
Adequacy of current FRB
programs.
.
The FRB programs currently in place were
planned after consultation with stakeholders including community interest
groups. They were planned at a time when many special interest groups were
strident in their opposition to any prescribed burning on public land and well
organised to make their opinions known. The effect these opinions had on the
planning process is uncertain. But what is certain is that if the planning
process was repeated today the communities affected by the recent fires and
others, would submit that the planned targets are too low and must be revised
upward to a realistic level. The January 2003 fires provide compelling evidence
supporting that view.
Compliance with current
FRB programs.
In 1992 the Auditor General found that the
Department of Conservation and Environment had failed to achieve its planned
fuel-reduction targets and that those areas the Department identified as
warranting the highest level of protection to human life, property and public
assets received the lowest level of protection. In fact, 50%
less than planned. In 2003 the Auditor General found that since 1994,
FRB has never met the Department’s planning and operational targets.
Metaphorically, the time-bomb got bigger, its fuse got shorter, nature lit the
fuse in January 2003 and too much got burnt in too short a time.
The reason this happened had nothing to do
with weather patterns and opportunities (or lack of) to do FRB over the two
decades. It happened because in that time, attitude and structural changes
within public land management relegated fire prevention to a non-core activity.
As a consequence, FRB was not given the highest priority amongst priorities
competing for the resources needed to do the work. In allowing this, the
Department ignored the truism heralded by Judge Stretton (1) and endorsed by
Sir Esler Hamilton Barber (12), that fire prevention must be the paramount
consideration of the forest manager.
EFFECTIVENESS OF
PREPAREDNESS.
I said in my preamble that land and fire
management agencies have achieved better outcomes in the recent past than they
did this year. To verify that statement requires a valid benchmark against
which the performance of the emergency services in 2003 is compared.
The events of 1939 are not a valid benchmark.
At that time many people lived at sawmills deep within forests, there was no
planned FRB, fire fighters used rudimentary equipment and their efforts were
not coordinated. The drought was worse than this year and the fire weather on
January 13th, the day most damage occurred, was far worse than on
any day during the January 2003 fires. For two months prior to
A better benchmark is the 1984/85-fire
season. Both the 84/85 and 02/03 fire seasons were preceded by a long drought
and enough rain fell in the winter and spring immediately prior to each fire
season to promote the growth of grass on private properties. Lightning caused a
similar number of fires in the same areas on both occasions. The events of the
1984/85-fire season are summarized in a Departmental Report (15) that says in
part:
"In mid-January an unprecedented
number of fires started from lightning strikes. One hundred and eleven (111)
such fires started on public land between late afternoon on 14 January and 0900
hours the next day
.
At the time these fires occurred the
Department was heavily involved in assisting the Country Fire Authority with
major fires at Anakie, Werribee Gorge, Avoca Broadford and Beechworth.
As well as the fires which started in
Many of the lightning fires in forest
areas started in remote, inaccessible mountain country where firefighting was
difficult, hazardous and time-consuming. They burnt more than 150000 ha and had
a perimeter in excess of 1000 km before they were controlled. About one-third
of the perimeter had to be established and held in steep mountain country where
there was no conventional access.
An unprecedented effort was made in the
The Report lists the resources used in the
firefight, area burnt by individual fires, damage to private and public assets
and goes on to say:
"The fires were brought under
control without any help from the weather. The campaign lasted two weeks and
cost approx. $7 million (excluding contribution by Armed Services)."
The task faced by emergency services on
The extent and quality of FRB programs peaked
just prior to the 1984/85-fire season. Control of the alpine fires in 1985 was
made easier when some of them spread into areas where the fuels had been
reduced and modified by FRB. This was obvious in the headwaters of the Buckland
and Catherine Rivers south of Mt Buffalo.
FRB was not the only reason the alpine fires
burnt less area in 1985 than the recent fires did. Initial attack by ground
crews was faster and more effective in 1985. At that time there was a larger
work- force of experienced firefighters working in the forests. That work-force
included people working on hydro-electricity projects; tree fellers, sniggers
and log carters employed by the timber industry; graziers; forest workers
building fire access tracks, maintaining roads and tracks, and picking seed for
forest regeneration and forest officers supervising forest licensees, forest
works and planning autumn prescribed burning for forest regeneration and fuel
reduction. That work-force and the vehicles and equipment it used daily in the
forests was immediately available on
One facet of firefighting
that showed dramatic improvement in the recent fires is the ability of the
emergency services to protect life and property when a large forest fire moves
onto private property. They did
this by concentrating maximum resources at or near the interface of forest and
private property and defended assets by backburning and/or combating
"ember attacks". With one obvious exception, (Wulgulmurang) this
strategy certainly reduced damage to private assets. Personnel involved were
well equipped, well trained, dedicated and courageous. It is a costly strategy
and places an enormous burden on volunteers and local communities
The success of this strategy must not divert
your Inquiry from addressing the things that caused the fires to get so large
and "ember attacks" so common. The existence of hazardous fuels was
one of the reasons why the fires got large and the sole reason for "ember
attacks". Government agencies responsible for managing public land manage
the fuel and therefore must manage the fires on that land. The law confirms the
duty that goes with that responsibility. If that duty had been discharged more
widely and more effectively in the decade prior to 2002/03, there would have
been less need for a strategy that fought the fires at or near the
forest/private property interface.
IN SUMMARY.
(I). The successor to the Forests Commission
has lost much of the corporate memory of the lesson learned from the Royal
Commission Inquiry into the 1939 bushfires, viz; that fire prevention must be
the paramount consideration of the forester. (1), (12). The National Parks
Authority did not emerge as a major player in fire prevention until the area of
national parks was significantly increased nearly four decades later. Parks
Victoria has no corporate memory of having its culture and knowledge of fire
management scrutinized by a Royal Commission or judicial Inquiry. The
diminished commitment to fire prevention by both agencies was a cause of some
fires started by lightning becoming large.
(II). The extent and quality of programs to
modify hazardous fuels on public land by prescribed burning fell consistently
through the last two decades. As a consequence
(III). Statements made during the recent
fires by CEO, Parks Victoria, about fire, fire behaviour and FRB have no basis
in science and are demonstrably wrong. These and other statements created a
perception that the Premier and some Ministers were seriously misled about some
aspects of the firefight. Many people believe that the flawed knowledge about
bushfires that is held as the highest levels in Parks Victoria contributed to
the build up of hazardous fuels in national parks. These people do not trust a
culture that ignores the reality that parks and neighbors can, and must,
co-exist with managed fire. And they are angry when management defends the
indefensible.
(IV). A law that places on one agency, the
duty to carry out proper and sufficient work for the prevention and suppression
of fire in every state forest and national park, and allows another agency to
compromise that duty if the work is on a national park, is a bad law. It was
tolerable in the past when national parks were smaller. It is not tolerable now
that national parks comprise a significant proportion of forested public land.
RECOMMENDATION.
I recommend you advise the Government that
in regard to your first term of reference
I can add to this submission if requested and
would be pleased to be advised of opportunities to speak with you in the fire
affected areas or elsewhere.
References cited.
- Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Causes of and
Measures taken to Prevent the Bush Fires of
January 1939 and to protect Life and Property; and The Measures to be
taken to Prevent Bushfires in
- Fire and the Australian Biota.
- Luke R. H. & McArthur A. G. Bushfires in
- Fire Protection and Fuel-Reduction Burning in
- Review of Vegetation-Based Fire in
- Report of the Fire Review Panel conducting a review of the CALM
prescribed burning Policy and Practices and Wildfire Threat Analysis. A
Report to the Hon. Kevin J Minson, MLA Minister of the Environment,
- The Effectiveness of Fuel- Reduction Burning. Department of
Conservation Forests and Lands Research Report No. 25, 1985.
- The effect of fuel reduction burning on the suppression of four
wildfires in western
- The Effectiveness of Fuel- Reduction Burning: Five Case Histories.
Department of Conservation and Environment, Research Report No. 10. 1981.
- Tolhurst K. Prescribed Burning in
- Aerial Ignition of
- Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Occurrence of Bush and
Grass Fires in
- Report of the Bushfire Review Committee on Bushfire Disaster
Preparedness and Response in
- Report on matters regarding the Moggs Creek Fire (Otways Fire No.
4. 1994/95) for the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources,
- Summary of Significant Events 1984/85 Fire Season. Presented to
Australian Association of Rural Fire Authorities by Department of Conservation,
Forests and Lands,
CAREER SYNOPSIS.
Athol Hodgson earned a national and international reputation in the
fields of fire ecology, fire behaviour and fire management during a
professional career spanning four decades.
He held a number of senior posts in the
Victorian public service including OiC Forest Environment and Recreation;
Chief, Division of Forest Management and Commissioner of Forests in the Forests
Commission and Chief Fire Officer in the Department of Conservation Forests and
Lands. As a senior manager in the public sector he served on a number of Boards
and Committees including the Board of the Country Fire Authority, the State
Disaster Committee(Displan), the steering Committee of
the National Bushfire Research Unit, CSIRO and the Australian Association of
Rural Fire Authorities. He was a member of a Trade Mission to
.
He retired from Government service in 1987
and has since used his fire management expertise in a number of projects
including:
- 1987-89. A/G Manager, National Safety Council of Australia (Vic
Division) Responsible for NSCA fire services offered to fire agencies and
private forest growers in
- 1990. Advisor to Q.C. in NSW Supreme Court in the case Blanche
& Ors.- V - Sutherland Shire Council & Ors. (subsequent
to the tragedy in the
- 1991. Consultant to the Fire Review Committee established by the
Tasmanian Government to review the role of vegetation-based fire in
- 1994. Consultant to State Forests NSW to review the Fuel
Management Program in the Eden Management Area.
- 1995. Consultant to State Forests NSW to review and report on that
agency’s Fire Management in NSW.
- 1996. The preparation of a Prescribed Burning Manual for the
Victorian Department of Natural Resources and Environment
- Current. Consultant to Blake Dawson Waldron acting for NSW Farmers
Association re: damages from fire that escaped from the
PUBLICATIONS.
He has published a number of articles on fire
management in Australian and overseas professional journals. A list is
available on request.